I’m quite
intrigued by cheap talk, probably because it constitutes about 90 per cent of my
conversations. Cheap talk models would probably be better understood if course
instructors use more frequently occurring examples from the students’ lives. Consider
the example of asking an instructor what the syllabus for an exam is. He has
(or will) set the paper himself and he knows whether or not a student should
read a certain paper with a probability of 100 percent. However, there are
conflicting interests at work. The instructor wants the student to read and
learn as much as possible and uses the exam as an incentive mechanism to
achieve his end. He may also want to ask a student to read all the papers in a
reading list because he wants to keep his options open (in the event that he is
yet to draft the question paper). So when a student asks an instructor whether
a paper that was not covered in class but was referred to in some lecture or is
available in the reading list is important for the exam, the standard answer
is, “You can read through it”: the babbling
equilibrium. Just as the theory predicts, this isn’t reason enough for many
students to understand that there’s no point in playing the game at all.
Economics students would probably be a lot smarter if they weren't so rational.